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CONCEPTS FOR A PHILOSOPHY OF AIR INTELLIGENCE

Lewis R. Long

I should like to set forth certain concepts for air intelligence that I feel would vitalize an air intelligence philosophy and could lead to an air intelligence policy and doctrine consistent with the dominant role that air power must play in the years to come. I make no claim of originality in all these concepts; nor do I consider that they alone would form a sound air intelligence doctrine. However, together with the valid concepts contained in the doctrinal manuals, they would, I am convinced, provide better guidance to the field than has heretofore been available.

I should like to emphasize that all the concepts presented are meant to be applied within the framework of one overriding concept for a philosophy of air intelligence — that air intelligence is geared to air power in a nuclear age and that it has the same predominant characteristics as has the air force — range, speed, mobility, flexibility, and penetrative ability.

Because air forces have the capability of flying to any point on the globe and returning to any desired location, air intelligence must provide basic information to guide such flights in peace or in war. Because air forces exert a dynamic impact on all forms of international relations, air intelligence must be prepared to expose for the scrutiny of air commanders the entire structure of other nations and to advise and assist in the determination of air strategy and policies.

In the established principles for the successful employment of air forces it is considered that the air forces are an entity. Even so, air intelligence must be considered indivisible and responsive at all levels of operation to employment as a single aggregate instrument. Air intelligence must be employed for the attainment of a common objective, which — in essence — is to contribute to the security of the nation. Air intelligence provides the key to proper employment of the air forces in exercising the initiative in many different conditions of international relations, in taking advantage of different opportunities

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as they occur, and also in creating opportunities in which benefits to the US may accrue by the utilization of air forces in peace or in war. Air intelligence must also guide the air force in exploiting the principle of surprise, in order to attain both military and psychological advantages through speed, deception, audacity, originality, and concentration. For the present, air intelligence must concentrate on indications of imminence of hostilities, without neglecting information on capabilities and vulnerabilities of potential enemy countries. This concentration of effort not only will contribute to the security of our forces but also will provide guidance for combat operations if war is forced upon us. Finally, air intelligence must be carefully coordinated through proper control.

CONCEPT NUMBER ONE. *Intelligence agencies are never more at war than in periods of nominal peace.* The logical outgrowth of this concept is, of course, the fact that the success of the initial phases of war (and in this thermonuclear age these probably will also constitute the decisive phases) will depend on the quality of intelligence produced in peace. Most people can understand and pay lip service, at least, to the latter idea, but they balk completely at a rational consideration of the first one when it comes to providing tangible support needed by the intelligence structure. I have never, in peacetime, seen an intelligence staff at any echelon that was not undermanned, overworked, and restricted in its operations by a lack of real appreciation on the part of the command for the goals the intelligence section had set for itself to accomplish in the light of the command mission.

At all echelons intelligence staffs must have adequate numbers of the best qualified personnel, maximum equipment, facilities, and funds; maximum freedom of action; and coequal status with other major staff elements. It can be categorically stated that if the air force intelligence structure had all the support it could profitably employ — and fully justify — in peacetime, its resources would be ample for any type of war we might become involved in.

Let us now analyse each of the requirements (personnel, material support, freedom of action, and coequal status) in terms of what other writers have had to say, bearing in mind these three basic intelligence missions: to provide timely warning of the imminence of hostilities (whether on a total or limited war

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basis); to provide detailed knowledge of the capabilities and vulnerabilities of potential enemy nations and of friendly and neutral nations; and to provide the best possible intelligence as to the intentions of foreign nations, particularly those that are our potential enemies.

PERSONNEL. During wartime, all the services drew heavily on civilian professions for manning intelligence posts. Lawyers, insurance adjustors, investigators, police enforcement officers, scientific and technical personnel, and teachers were put into uniform; and, by and large, these people carried the intelligence workload of the services. By and large, too, their contributions compared favorably with those of professional military people. There have been numerous attempts made to identify the qualifications for intelligence personnel. Farago¹ lists ten major groups of traits which "the good spy is supposed to possess" in order to qualify for that particular aspect of intelligence work. For the most part, these same traits could be used as a starting basis for selection of personnel for other intelligence tasks.

First of all, his morale must be high and he must be genuinely interested in the job ahead.

Second, he must be energetic, zealous, and enterprising.

Third, he must be resourceful, a quick and practical thinker. He must have good judgment and know how to deal with things, people, and ideas. He must be proficient in some occupational skill.

Fourth, he must be emotionally stable, capable of great endurance under stress. He must be calm and quiet, tolerant and healthy.

Fifth, he must have the ability to get along with other people, to work as a member of a team, to understand the foibles of others while being reasonably free of the same foibles himself.

Sixth, he must know how to inspire collaboration, to organize, administer and lead others. He must be willing to accept responsibility.

¹Farago, Ladislav, *War of Wits* (NY, Funk & Wagnalls Co., 1954), p. 187.

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Seventh, he must be discreet, have a passion for anonymity and know how to keep his mouth shut and preserve a secret.

Eighth, he must be able to bluff and mislead, but only when bluffing and misleading become necessary.

Ninth, he must be agile, rugged, and daring.

Tenth, he must have the ability to observe everything, to memorize details accurately. He must be able to report on his observations lucidly, to evaluate his observations and relate them to the greater complex of things.

MATERIAL SUPPORT. I should like to stress the importance of allocating the maximum in equipment, facilities, and funds to intelligence work in time of peace with a quotation from Sun Tzu,² the Chinese military oracle, whose writings on the art of war in 500 B. C. have influenced military thinking down to this day.

Hostile armies may face each other for years, striving for victory which is decided in a single day. This being so, to remain in ignorance of the enemy's condition simply because one grudges the outlay of a hundred ounces of silver in honors and emoluments is the height of inhumanity.

One who acts thus is no leader of men, no present help to his sovereign, no master of victory.

Thus, what enables the wise sovereign and the good general to strike and conquer, and achieve things beyond the reach of ordinary men, is foreknowledge.

In speaking of the cost of the British secret service as a whole (both positive and counterintelligence), Seth noted:³

In 1913 the Secret Services cost 46,000 pounds; in 1939, 500,000 pounds; during the recent war 52,000,000 pounds annually; and in 1953, 5,000,000 pounds. . . . It is worth many times this amount, for though the American, French and Russian (secret) services

² Sun Tzu Wu, *The Art of War* (Translation by Lionel Giles, Introduction and notes by B/G Thomas R. Phillips, Harrisburg, Pa., The Military Service Publishing Co., 1944).

³ Ronald Seth, *Spies at Work*, London: Peter Own Limited MCMLIV, p. 202.

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are now more extensive than at any time in this century, British secret service still maintains its lead in performance and results.

Farago gives a somewhat different order of magnitude for British expenditures for intelligence. He said that the 1954 budget was three million pounds and that this amount was the highest in the entire history of the British Secret Service. He pointed out, however, that this figure is deceptive because it represents only allotments from public funds and he adds: "The bulk of Britain's intelligence revenue comes from private funds, such as dividends of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, some of whose shares are held by the Admiralty."⁴

Farago then gave an indication of what US military services are spending for intelligence. In fiscal year 1955, the Army asked for \$54,454,000 for intelligence, and for fiscal years 1952-54, inclusive, the Army spent a total of \$176,400,000 on intelligence. Yet this represented less than one-half of one percent of the total Army budget.⁵ Then, stressing his thesis that the cold war is a "War of Wits," Farago pointed out relative expenditures for intelligence in the Continental Army and in the services today: ⁶

Between 1776 and 1781, George Washington spent approximately eleven percent of his entire military budget on intelligence operations. The fact that today we spend less than one percent of our peacetime military budget on these same activities shows how little effort is being made to solve the "friction" by intellectual means rather than brute force.

From the contacts I have had with various British intelligence officers, visits to JIB (Joint Intelligence Bureau) and some of the intelligence officers of the Air ministry, and from comparing the results of British intelligence with those of USAF intelligence, I am certainly inclined to agree, at least partially, with Seth's last statement for the quality of British intelligence production is invariably very high, and the quantity compares favorably with that produced by the much larger USAF intelligence staffs. The British traditionally have been willing to

⁴ Farago, *op. cit.*, p. 50.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 51.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 345.

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spend a great amount of money, time, and effort in the collection of intelligence information, more, perhaps, than most modern nations. They have not, in other words, weighed results obtained by intelligence efforts on a completely pragmatic basis, as we "practical Americans" are inclined to do; they know that one cannot package intelligence results on a "pound-for-pound" basis. So for the past two hundred years they have been preeminent in the field. This is not to say that they have not made serious mistakes; but, by and large, their intelligence estimates have been remarkably sound. Moreover, they have used periods of nominal peace to extend and consolidate their intelligence activities, not only for the purpose of preparing for the next war but also (what is even more important) preparing for the peace to follow.

FREEDOM OF ACTION. As background for a discussion of the need for granting maximum freedom of action to air force intelligence, I should like to quote the following passage from the Report of the Task Force on Intelligence Activities:⁷

Effect of Diplomacy on the Over-All Collection of Intelligence.

The task force has recognized the incompatibility in method between the practice of diplomacy and the more direct and active operations incident to the collection of intelligence and the conduct of cold war.

While all contribute to the end in view, conflicts between them must be resolved, usually on a high level, and always in the national interest. It must be realized that diplomacy is not an end in itself; that while political ends must be served and unjustifiable risks avoided, the collection of intelligence is a vital element in the fight to preserve our national welfare and existence. Instances have come to the attention of the task force where too conservative an attitude has prevailed, often to the detriment of vigorous and timely action in the field.

Although the foregoing comment was made in connection with a discussion of the intelligence activities of the Depart-

⁷ *Intelligence Activities, A Report to the Congress, by the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, June 1955, pp. 42-43. (Hereafter referred to as "Task Force Report.")*

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ment of State, it is every bit as applicable to air intelligence as to the Department of State because the air attaché system, which is a major contributor of intelligence information, functions as an integral part of the State Department's Foreign Service.

It is altogether appropriate that, generally speaking, diplomatic considerations take precedence over the collection requirements of the attachés. Nevertheless, within the framework of that principle (which is a part of the principle of civilian control over the military establishment), it should be obvious from the implications of the Task Force findings that a less conservative attitude toward opportunities for collection of intelligence information should permeate not only the diplomatic service but also the military establishment.

I shall not devote much attention to detailed suggestions for carrying out intelligence operations. My concern is with the promotion of principles that would provide the type of climate in which competent people, using their innate intelligence and ingenuity, can devise an infinite number of ways in which to collect and produce air intelligence — ways which must, of course, be within the framework of US national objectives at all times. Nevertheless, I feel very strongly that we should take a page out of the British Secret Service book and put our intelligence collection efforts on a basis where they can pay their own way, at least in part. This would be a long-term proposition and it would be impossible of achievement under the existing regimentation that governs all business enterprises in which the government is officially engaged.

COEQUAL STATUS WITH OTHER MAJOR STAFF ELEMENTS. There is, as far as I can discern, no rhyme nor reason in subordinating intelligence as a staff section to operations. My biggest objection to the subordination of intelligence to operations lies in the fact that the operations officer is automatically placed in the position where he frequently makes purely command decisions. The intelligence officer is supposed to advise the commanding officer as to what the enemy can and probably will attempt to do that would interfere with the accomplishment of the command mission. The operations officer is supposed to advise the commanding officer as to what his own forces can and should do. The commanding officer is then in a position to weigh both his own and the enemy's

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capabilities and to make a sound command decision as to command action. It is totally wrong for the operations officer to make such a decision, for the commanding officer is thereby deprived of the full value (and probably full information) of enemy capabilities, vulnerabilities, and intentions. Zacharias, commenting on the fallacy of subordinating, told the Congressional Committee investigating the Pearl Harbor disaster that one of the organizational deficiencies which was a contributing factor was: ⁸

That the planning officers were allowed to take over the Intelligence function of evaluation. This resulted in individuals without a full knowledge of the Japanese or their psychology determining what the Japanese might do. This practice applied not only in Washington, but also at Pearl Harbor, where the erroneous conclusion was reached by the planning officer that there was no chance of an air attack on Pearl Harbor.

CONCEPT NUMBER TWO. *Success achieved by intelligence in peace will determine the outcome of the war.*

General Kuter stated: ⁹

In jet-atomic warfare there will be no room for gross errors of judgment. There will be no time, should hostilities start, to correct mistakes in the types of forces that we have provided, the manner in which they have been organized and trained, or the way we fight. And the terrible penalty for failure could be quick and complete defeat.

Many factors are involved in any satisfactory answer. But one thing is sure. The question cannot be answered satisfactorily unless we have the proper doctrine, and unless the doctrine is accepted.

For years the US has believed that its greatest military potential lay in its industrial might. The validity of this belief was demonstrated in World Wars I and II and again in Korea. We can be sure that any Soviet attacks against this country will be planned to destroy not only our retaliatory force but also our industrial potential. Thus we can see that "no longer

⁸ Zacharias, p. 253.

⁹ Kuter, Lawrence S., Lt. Gen., "No Room For Error," *Air Force Magazine* (AWC Curriculum Handout #36-4-a, 24 November 1955).

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will the US or any other country be able to build up its military forces and rely on its industrial potential after the war has begun." ¹⁰

Intelligence must be developed before war breaks out if it is to influence our preparations, provide a foundation for our planning, and guide early phases of operations. It is true that Mr. Allen Dulles, present Director of the CIA,¹¹ achieved unprecedented success in the history of espionage with the intelligence network he established in Germany, operating from Switzerland, during the war.

. . . Through this network Mr. Dulles managed to start a conspiracy within the high command of the German armies in the south and to bring about the surrender of the very army on which Hitler was dependent for the prolonging of the war from behind the legendary "Alpine redoubt."

However, the situation in Japan was a far different matter. Through shortsightedness and perhaps ineptitude and inexperience, the US had failed to establish the groundwork for an effective espionage system in Japan, notwithstanding the fact that Zacharias and other authorities on Japan had been aware of the need and had advocated such prior planning. In view of the steadily deteriorating relations that existed between Japan and the US right up to the surprise attack against Pearl Harbor, this failure to develop, in advance of war, a workable system for systematic collection (in Japan) of intelligence information during the war that most intelligence personnel were sure was virtually inevitable is an extremely black mark against the US intelligence agencies of that time. Moreover, this country made no serious effort to establish an intelligence net within Japan during the war because it was felt that the effort was far too great in relation to its possible value. Farago pointed out that it is a virtual impossibility ". . . to set up a local network in an enemy country under wartime conditions. . . ." ¹² [Allen Dulles' success notwithstanding]

¹⁰ Thomas K. Finletter, *Power and Policy*, New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., p. 256.

¹¹ Farago, *op. cit.*, p. 183.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 182.

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How can we account for the fact that, against all reasonable odds, the US did establish a satisfactory espionage net in Germany after war started but failed to do so in Japan, its other major enemy? I suggest that the reason lies, among other factors, in the accessibility of Germany before the outbreak of war. In other words, more Americans and individuals from Allied nations had contacts before the war in Germany than in Japan. Interestingly enough, the Soviets failed to re-establish within Germany an adequate espionage net:

... when their original network, known as the *Rote Kapelle* or *Red Orchestra*, was smashed. They managed to create such networks only in countries of their wartime allies, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States, and in neutral Switzerland, traditional battleground of international espionage.¹³

The Soviets did achieve remarkable success in Japan (remember the Sorge espionage case?)¹⁴ It seems to me that there is a direct correlation between the accessibility of a potential enemy country just before the outbreak of hostilities and the probability of being able to establish (or re-establish) and maintain an espionage net in that country after war breaks out. What does this mean, as far as the US is concerned at the present time? If it is difficult to penetrate the Iron Curtain today, it will be even harder when war breaks out. Therefore, we must go all-out to penetrate it, and to establish many strong, diversified, and versatile nets as soon as possible. We cannot do this under the existing limitations of personnel, equipment, and funds. Yet maximum reliance must be placed on the ability of intelligence to decide by whom, when, where, and in what strength the US may be attacked. The responsibility of the Directorate of Intelligence (ACS/I, since 1 July 1957), USAF, is to develop this information regarding our susceptibility to air attack — this in an air-nuclear age.

CONCEPT NUMBER THREE. *Air intelligence must, on a continuing basis, encompass all aspects of power in foreign nations (political, economic, and psychosocial, as well as military), both in the present and in the historical perspective. Moreover, it must speak out on matters of national strategy.*

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 182.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 163, 166, 179, 181, 212, 219-220.

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Heretofore, air intelligence (as well as army and navy intelligence) has confined itself primarily to an evaluation of the military power of foreign nations. The National Security Council has directed the air force to interest itself primarily in intelligence of foreign air forces and has assigned responsibility for covering other aspects of national power to the other US intelligence agencies.

It has long been an American tradition that the military establishment should remain free from the "taint of politics." As a result, the military has shied away from any contact with political problems. This even reached the point before World War II where few of the regular military establishment exercised their constitutional right to vote in elections.

This fear of military domination in our national life stems, of course, from our inherited distrust of all forms of tyranny and autocracy. Before the time that military power became inextricably tied to the other forms of national power, perhaps even as late as the First World War, this attitude may have had some validity in our national consciousness. However, Clausewitz would not have subscribed to the complete separation of military thinking from the remainder of national life and activities. He pointed out that war is merely an extension of national, political policy by other means.¹⁵ Hitler demonstrated his conviction that war is merely a "mopping-up process" by capitalizing on the gains made by his fifth column. Certainly the Marxists have from the beginning showed the world by word and deed that the line of demarcation between politics and military action is extremely nebulous.

It can and probably will be argued that air intelligence should "stick to its knitting" and concentrate on ascertaining the strengths and weaknesses of foreign air forces in the traditional fashion (in which the army is supposed to develop intelligence on foreign ground forces; the navy, on foreign naval forces; the air force, on foreign air forces; and the State Department and CIA, on foreign political and economic strengths and weaknesses). However, as it is air power that will have to carry the brunt of any initial contacts with the enemy, as well as continuously to seek out and destroy all aspects of the enemy

¹⁵ Karl von Clausewitz, General, *On War* (Translation by O. J. Mattijs Jolles), Washington, D. C.: Infantry Journal Press, 1950, p. 16.

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warmaking potential and will to fight, air intelligence must have the capability of advising the Chief of Staff, USAF, where and when to hit the enemy in order to hurt him most.

It seems incontrovertible to me that we have reached a place in history where the military establishment, particularly the air force, must concern itself with political problems (as well as the economic and psychosocial problems) — the traditional American feeling in the matter notwithstanding. General Samford, Director of Intelligence, Headquarters USAF, agreed on this point, in response to a question asked by the writer, following his lecture to the Air War College. He stated, in effect, "There is a growing community of thought that the military establishment should get into the fields of political and economic warfare, as well as psychological warfare."¹⁶ Air intelligence, obviously, must be in the vanguard of this new approach.

CONCEPT NUMBER FOUR. *Intelligence must take a dynamic approach.* In speaking of the fact that data on the Soviet Bloc are inadequate, the Task Force Report on Intelligence Activities considered that security measures adopted by the Communists have been exceptionally effective, particularly in comparison with American security measures, which make it relatively simple for foreign nations to collect vital secrets. The task force admonishes, however:

. . . The information we need, particularly for our Armed Forces, is potentially available. Through concentration on the prime target we must exert every conceivable and practicable effort to get it. Success in this field depends on greater boldness at the policy level, a willingness to accept certain calculated political and diplomatic risks, and full use of technological capabilities.¹⁷

Opportunities to increase air intelligence coverage of Soviet capabilities and intentions include:

a. The increasing of our clandestine operations and efforts to infiltrate the iron and bamboo curtains from all peripheral countries, taking maximum advantage not only of border-

¹⁶ Samford, John A., Major General, "Objectives for the Use of Force," lecture to Army War College, 2 January 1956.

¹⁷ Task Force Report, *op. cit.*, p. 69.

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crossing techniques on land and by air drop but also neutral shipping and US submarines, particularly in the Arctic Ocean and the Black Sea coastal areas.

b. The establishment of contacts with and provision of support to (in return for services rendered) agents from among known governments in exile, such as those from the Baltic and East European Satellite nations; the known 10,000,000 Chinese living outside China, as minority groups throughout Asia; all known religious organizations, business firms, and governmental agencies throughout the Free World having dealings with the Soviet Bloc; all known visitors to Soviet-dominated territory, such as trade union officials, scientists, airline and shipping crewmen, and others; and all defectors from iron curtain countries.

c. The attempt to bribe, intimidate, subvert, or otherwise cause Soviet and Satellite diplomats, government officials, technicians, or visitors abroad to "double" for us upon their return — or to defect and remain in the West.

d. The making of surreptitious photographic penetration flights with high capability aircraft at irregular intervals, to cover peripheral areas.

e. The purchase of controlling interest in the most active Western firms having dealings with the Soviet or Satellite nations in order to use these firms to collect intelligence information, spread favorable propaganda, subvert Soviet and Satellite nationals, and otherwise create situations behind the iron and bamboo curtains that would be favorable to the West.

f. The employment of such outstanding historians as Alfred J. Toynbee; political scientists, as Professor William M. McGovern and Dr. Robert Strausz-Hupe; geographers, as G. Donald Hudson; ethnologists, as Margaret Meade; and authorities on Russia and Communism as Dr. Marc Szeftel and Mr. James Burnham. The individuals named represent only a few of the potential list of qualified consultants; the profound and detailed knowledge of foreign peoples and areas in their respective professions that is possessed by people of this stature would furnish a wellspring of ideas of inestimable value to air intelligence. In addition to enriching the staff with people of this caliber we should hire outstanding representatives in the advertising and public relations fields (preferably those having experience in foreign areas), who can assist the factual experts

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in packaging the ideas we want to use in our "War of Wits" with the Soviets, this struggle for the minds of men.

CONCEPT NUMBER FIVE. *Intelligence should be used as an offensive weapon, one capable of influencing the outcome of either the cold war or any hot war, peripheral as well as total.* Although there are no apparent indications that the Soviet Union, during the next few years, intends to take action of the sort that would surely precipitate another world conflict, we must be always on the alert to the possibility that such a conflict might arise through miscalculation on their part. The dangers are greatest in the peripheral areas, where Satellite peoples might get out of hand and take action "from which we cannot retreat without disaster; then the chances of keeping war limited are very remote."¹⁸

The difficulty is not in the lack of desire to exercise such restraint, but in the fact that the things we stand to lose are of such great value that there is no chance of limiting phases of conflict. To have mutual understanding and agreement between enemies is essential if conflict is to be localized. What does this mean to air intelligence? Simply this: we must produce intelligence on every facet of enemy life. To do this, air intelligence should control or at least coordinate all air force agencies that to any degree operate in enemy territory or attack behind enemy lines or perform other than strictly military operations in areas that may become the scene of battle or in areas where, in the cold war, the air forces encounter Communist influences.

CONCEPT NUMBER SIX. *Intelligence must be used systematically.* Commanders, policymakers, planners, and operations personnel at all echelons must rely upon, then plan, then act not only upon intelligence but also upon intelligence recommendations — within practical limits of our own capability and feasibility of such recommendations. We have long expressed as a principle of intelligence the concept that it must be supplied to the interested command in time to be of use. Unfortunately, in intelligence circles there has not been, it seems to me, equal emphasis placed upon submission of intelligence to the commander and his staff in such a form and so convincingly expressed that it will receive the prompt attention

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

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and responsive command action that it warrants. Stressing the need for reducing the margin of error inherent in any human undertaking, General White pointed out the need for educating our planners and our leaders. He said that poor command decisions and inferior or unimaginative staff work would nullify the tremendous effort that has gone into developing an extremely expensive air force. He added:

... Superior employment of air weapons must be based on complete understanding of the nature of air warfare, the political and military context within which the air forces are operating, and a sound but imaginative understanding of targets and weapons.¹⁹

There also has been entirely too little emphasis on the concept that command plans and action should be based on intelligence. This has not always been the fault of intelligence. Nevertheless, too often in the air force, particularly, operational plans have been prepared with absolutely no regard for the intelligence estimate of enemy capabilities and intentions that these selfsame plans were designed to counter. In my experience as a staff officer at various echelons of command, there have been few instances in which command war plans, emergency plans, or operations plans have actually been geared to the intelligence that gave rise to the necessity for such plans. More often than not, the intelligence annex is merely prepared at the same time as the basic plan and the other annexes and all are stapled together at one time. The proper procedure, and the one that we in intelligence at USAFE (US Air Forces in Europe) were finally able to sell to the planners, should be this. The intelligence estimate of the situation is prepared first and given to the commander and to all his staff agencies in advance of the planning cycle. The basic plan and all the annexes (including the intelligence annex) are then prepared simultaneously, with a view to countering the threat indicated in the intelligence estimate.

I believe this failure to take the intelligence estimate into consideration at every stage in the planning cycle in the military establishment stems by and large from an American pre-

¹⁹ White, Thomas D., "The Current Concept of American Military Strength," AU Quarterly Review, Vol. VII, Spring 1954 (AWC Curriculum Handout #56-2-B, 22 November 1955).

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dilection for ignoring in the policymaking cycle available intelligence regarding the capabilities and intentions of actual or potential enemies.

It seems to me that the intelligence family must find some way not only to improve the quality of its product but also to stimulate an acceptance of that product and a willingness to act upon it. The process of making positive recommendations by intelligence for command action would, I believe, materially improve this situation and would lead to a command acceptance of a principle advanced by General Ridgway, when he was Chief of Staff of the US Army. He stressed the fact that the present world situation makes it more important than ever to have complete information upon which to base economical deployment and effective employment of army forces, as well as to avoid surprise (obviously the same principle applies to all military forces). General Ridgway stated: "Adequate intelligence constitutes the fundamental basis for the calculation of risks, the formulation of plans, the development of materiel, the allocations of resources, and the conduct of operation."²⁰

CONCEPT NUMBER SEVEN. *Intelligence must continuously estimate enemy intentions as well as capabilities and vulnerabilities.* One of the biggest reasons that commanders at times have made their own estimates, rather than accept those of their intelligence officers, is simply that the intelligence officers have been unwilling to "go out on a limb" and estimate enemy intentions. Before the early 1930's the "method of intentions" was used by the US Army. It was a method used by the elder von Moltke. Shortly before 1936 the American Army adopted the "method of capabilities," which had been the method used by Napoleon.²¹

Admittedly the "method of intentions" is a difficult one and, for the inexperienced intelligence officer, nonhabit forming because the probability of error is extremely high. Success for this method depends not only on an intimate knowledge of the mentality of the opposing commanders as well as the tactical doctrine of the enemy but also upon such intangible things as the physical and mental condition of the opponent, his normal reactions, and reasoning processes. On the other hand, the

²⁰ Farago, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

²¹ Command and General Staff School, "Military Intelligence," p. 7.

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"method of capabilities" takes into consideration all lines of action open to the enemy. It does not discard any possible line until the enemy's dispositions are such that, even though he desired to adopt that line, he is physically incapable of doing so. Thus it strives by elimination to reduce the possibility down to one — the only one line of action which the enemy can take. This is the ideal, as far as intelligence is concerned, but it is seldom reached.

CONCEPT NUMBER EIGHT. *Intelligence is no longer a function of command, except at the higher echelons.* All of the services (particularly the air force) have traditionally paid only lip service to the principle that intelligence is a function of command. This has been amply demonstrated by a lack of provision for suitable intelligence staffing between World War I and World War II and by a demeaning of intelligence functions. My reasons for believing that intelligence should no longer be considered a function of command at all echelons are different from either of these.

In the first place if an all-out global war should occur, the US intelligence operations should be centrally controlled. Second, the entire intelligence process cannot reasonably be carried out at all echelons; therefore, even in a prolonged period of cold war, air intelligence operations must be, if not actually centrally controlled from Washington, at least concentrated in a small number of locations where the complete intelligence process is directed by one individual. Unquestionably, in the past, commanders of squadrons, groups, wings, even air divisions and air forces occasionally may have felt a twinge of conscience because they have been unable to see their way clear to carry out all the intelligence functions that manuals said they should, from collection through dissemination. These individuals may now draw a sigh of relief, as I view it; for in the air force, their primary intelligence function is to disseminate down to the troops air intelligence that has been received from higher echelons.

It may be argued that I am hereby cutting the rug out from under the principle I previously expressed — that the intelligence officer should not be subordinated to other staff officers but should report directly to the commanding officer. On the contrary, in these lower units, and even when his recognized

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duties are in accord with his actual duties, I still feel that the intelligence officer at every echelon of command should remain responsible only to the commanding officer or the chief of staff, and not to any other staff officer! He must maintain this independence of other staff considerations in order best to present to his commander the most complete intelligence picture and the most reasonable intelligence recommendations, even though he himself may not have developed either the intelligence estimate of the situation or the recommendations based on it.

At the major air force command levels there is no question in regard to major staff level standing for the intelligence officer as intelligence should continue to be for his commander a complete function of command, in the traditional sense. At the lower echelons, intelligence would still be a command responsibility, but rather more in the "special staff" tradition than the "general staff" concept.

CONCEPT NUMBER NINE. *Major headquarters staffs should get out of the operational aspects of intelligence to the maximum extent possible and should confine their attention largely to policymaking and flash or spot estimating functions.* This concept is closely related to some of the thinking indicated in the discussion of the preceding concept. Compared with the present tables of distribution, the intelligence staff of Headquarters USAF and the major subordinate commands would be relatively small. These staffs, however, would be comprised of highly qualified personnel, representing the maximum intelligence capability in the air force. Their functions would be primarily policymaking, inspection, liaison, and estimating. They would be prepared to give flash estimates of indications of the imminence of hostilities and spot estimates, as required by the commander and his staff. They would exercise staff supervision not only over the intelligence activities of all subordinate units of the command, but also over the collection and production activities of the intelligence centers belonging to the command; these centers would perform the operational aspects of the intelligence process for the entire command.

CONCEPT NUMBER TEN. *Air Intelligence (to include counterintelligence) must keep under continuous review and, to the maximum extent possible, must downgrade and publish its files concerning enemy capabilities, activities, and intentions.*

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What I am proposing is nothing less than declassifying certain carefully selected items of intelligence and counterintelligence regarding Soviet activities and providing such information to the American public on a planned basis. Let the American people get this information, but from authoritative sources and not from newspaper columnists.

Probably the most violent opposition to this proposal will come from some of my fellow intelligence officers, because traditionally, intelligence has had a moral responsibility to protect its sources, and rightly so. Nevertheless, intelligence files are bulging with information that represents such a conglomeration from so many sources that no one source could possibly be harmed by its disclosure. Let us substitute this type of information for at least some of the detailed data on our own military establishment that we now hand out so freely. I am confident that the public reaction to this policy would, in general, be very favorable, and that in the long run, the story of air power and the capabilities of the air force to safeguard the security interests of the US can be made synonymous in the minds of the American people.

So let's stop giving aid and comfort to our potential enemies and start a program designed to discomfort them on a global scale — by informing and arousing the American public and the rest of the free world with factual knowledge of Soviet activities and intentions. For example, an article in the September 1955 Reader's Digest discussed the disturbing story of the manner in which the Communists, who had infiltrated the military services and governmental structure of Iran, were prevented from taking over the entire country by the merest accident. As a result of the investigation, it was disclosed that five hundred Iranian officers were implicated in the plot, including numerous high-ranking individuals in both the Army and the police departments.²²

This story, terrifying in its implication for other countries, would, I submit, have had a much stronger impact on public awareness of the Communist threat to the world today had it been officially released by a government intelligence agency, rather than by a commercial writer. This is the type of run-

²² Joseph A. Mazandi and Edwin Muller, "The Hunch That Saved Iran," Reader's Digest, September 1955, pp. 59-60.

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of-the-mill basic intelligence available to the services which should be released to the public as soon and as fully as is practicable and, in any event, before some sharp news reporter can capitalize it.

CONCEPT ELEVEN. *All air intelligence concepts must be considered dynamic, kept under constant review, and revised to meet changing world situations.* It follows that air intelligence philosophy must be considered in its broadest sense as a constant search for principles. The doctrine and policies resulting from this process must be changed as new concepts are developed.

In this context, General Kuter provides another valid concept for developing an air intelligence policy, although he was applying it in the larger sense to the whole spectrum of air force thinking. "A true air doctrine accepted and exploited is the key to a sound military policy. We have the doctrine, now we must exploit it in a common strategy."²³ We don't, as yet, have an air intelligence policy or doctrine in writing, but if USAF will adopt that last admonition of General Kuter's as the basic air force intelligence policy, it will be only a matter of time until we have an air intelligence doctrine — one on which the commands may then soundly base their own intelligence policies.

²³ Kuter, *op. cit.*, p. 29.

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